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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
·V-

EDWARD ALBO ,

DAVID

Case No. 15351

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, DAVID EDWARD ALBO, appeals from a conviction
of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value in the

Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, DAVID EDWARD ALBO, was charged with Unlawful Distribution of a Controled Substance for Value in violation of
Utah

Code Ann. §58-37-8(a) (1953 as amended).

June,

1977, the appellant was found guilty of the offense as charged

by a jury.
in the

On the 17th day of

Subsequently, the appellant was sentenced to incarceration

Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of zero to ten

vears .
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and
judgment rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third
Judicial District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On the afternoon of April 27, 1977, Kayle Shaw, Jr.
contacted Gayle Lee Boone, appellant's co-defendant, and arranged
to meet with him later in that day at an establishment called "The

Gym" (T. 21) .

At that time, Shaw was working as an undercover agent

for the Utah State Liquor and Narcotics Enforcement Division (T. rn).
Several months earlier Shaw had been released from the Salt Lake Count
Jail where he was being held pending trial on three counts of Aggravat
Robbery, felonies of the first degree, and another felony charge of
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribut
for Value (T. 20).

At the time of this action Shaw was still

awaiti~

trial on those charges (T. 20).
Upon being released from jail Shaw reported to Tom CarlesOli
of the Bountiful City Police Department (T. 80).

Carleson then

introduced Shaw to agents of the State Liquor and Narcotics Control
Division (T. 81) and then put him to work as an undercover agent (T.11
At that time Shaw told the State agents that he "wanted to bust Gayle
Boone" (T. 82) .
After contacting Boone on April 22, 1977, Shaw contacted
the State Narcotics Division where he talked to Tom Carleson (T. 26)
Shaw then proceeded to the Division's office at the Fairgrounds where
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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he was searched (T. 26) and supplied with one thousand dollars worth

of twenty dollar bills (T. 27).
to Shaw's body (T. 32).

An electronic device was then attached

The device transmitted sounds originating in

the irmnediate area to police radios (T. 33-34).
Shaw then drove his own car to "The Gym", but he was followed
there by twelve other agents driving another six cars (T. 174).
contacted Boone at "The Gym" (T. 34).

Shaw

Shaw then testified that some

time later a transaction took place in which he exchanged the
thousand dollars for a package containing a brown substance (T. 54).
~en

the officers listening to their radios heard a prearranged signal

from Shaw they arrested Shaw, the appellant and the co-defendant,
Boone.
The appellant testified that Boone had phonedthe appellant
earlier that evening and told the appellant that he was ready to
repay an old debt (T. 406-408).

The appellant testified further that

he was to meet Boone at "The Gym" where he could collect the money
(T. 408).

When Boone entered the appellant's car and began to count

out the money owed to the appellant the arrest took place (T. 413).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS WHEN THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO ALLOW THEIR ADMISSION UNDER RULE 63(9)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
The appellant moved to suppress a recording of a conversation between Gayle Lee Boone and the State's informant, Kayle Shaw,
1

r (R. 54).

The motion was denied and the tape was received into
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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evidence (T. 333) .

The tape was made by recording a broadcast of the,

'

conversation transmitted by an electronic device secreted on the
informant's person (T. 32).

The broadcast was heard by some police

'i1

officers who had followed and were observing Shaw, although there was.a.
some question about what they heard.
Kayle Shaw, Jr., the key witness for the prosecution,

;c

testified about a conversation with the appellant's co-defendant, Gayl
Lee Boone. In the course of this converation Boone made a number of
statements that tended to incriminate the appellant.
i
i

11

The appellant lo

registered a continuing objection to these statements (T. 22) on the ar

~I

II

basis of hearsay because they were offered for the truth of the

i

asserted.

I'

II

The

matt~th

State attempted to have the statements made admissibl1te

pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 63 (9)

under the theory that the co·ae

defendant, Boone, and the appellant were engaged in a plan to commit a th,
crime.

"Tl

The hearsay statements which Boone made to Shaw that tende1 th<
to incriminate the appellant included:

Boone's statement that "hislDifei

hasn't arrived yet" (T. 35). "He. [the man delivering the drugs] shou!c it
be here in twenty minutes" (T. 36).
coIIDD.in' any time" (T. 37).

"He [the same man] should be

an

Shaw also testified that Boone said that de]

"his man" would be driving a "white Continental" and when such a car
pulled into the parking lot Shaw testified that he asked Boone if
that was "his man" and Boone replied "Yeah" (T. 47).

evi

On cross-examini to

tion Shaw testified that when he arrived at "The Gym" Boone told him a c
"my boy hasn't arrived" (T. 94) and after Shaw left to eat then retutl
Boone stated that "he hasn't arrived yet" (T. 97).

Shaw testified

further that Boone had told him that Boone's friend in a white
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~ontinental
[n

did arrive Boone instructed Shaw to wait inside (T. 103).

addition to this testimony, a tape recording of the conversation

'Jetween Boone and Shaw was admitted into evidence and the jury was
allowed to hear all of that conversation.
'1earsay

as to the appellant.

All this evidence was

At trial, Boone refused. to take the stand

so the appellant was unable to confront him about these statements.
The only other evidence to connect the appellant with a
1lan to cormnit a crime is the fact that he drove into the parking
lot at "The Gym" and parked his car (T. 186), and that when the
arrest was made the appellant and Boone were in the car with the money
'that Shaw had given Boone (T. 188).
1testified

The appellant took the stand and

that Boone owed him one thousand two hundred dollars (T. 412).

'He also testifed that Boone had called him earlier that day to tell

1

the appellant that he had his money and to come and pick it up at
"The Gym" (T. 408).

Upon arriving at "The Gym" the appellant testified

that Boone approached the car and asked the appellant to wait for a

'few minutes and when Boone returned with the money and began to count

1

11

it out in the appellant's car, both Boone and the appellant were

arrested (T. 412-413).

The appellant stated that he was not Boone's

delivery boy (T. 414).
The trial court did not make a finding that the hearsay
evidence was admissible against the appellant.

The court proceeded

to ins true t the jury that if they found that there was a Plan to cormni t
a crime on the basis of evidence independent of the hearsay, then they

~
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1

may use Boone's hearsay statements against the appellant

(R. 85).

.O

By stipulation of counsel, and with the permission of the court the ;s
appellant was allowed to take exception to this instruction at the
time for sentencing (T. July 8, 1977, p.2).
The State contended that these hearsay statements were
vicarious admissions pursuant to Rule 63(9) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

That rule provides:
Vicarious Admissions. As against a party, a statement which would be admissible if made by the declarant at the hearing if (a) the judge finds the declarant is unavailable as a witness and that the statement
concerned a matter within the scope of an agency
or employment of the declarant for the party and was
made before the termination of such relationship, or
(b) the party and the declarant were participating
in a plan to comm.it a crime or a civil wrong and
the statement was relevant to the plan or its subject matter and was made while the plan was in
existence and before its complete execution or other
termination, or (c) one of the issues between the party
and the proponent of the evidence of the statement
is a legal liability of the declarant, and the statement tends to establish that liability;

The note following Rule 63 (7)

2

of the Utah Rules of Evidence express:

covers Rule 63 (9) and makes the case of State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 36i,

1. During the course of this trial the Court has received testim:my and evidence
of conversations between the defendant Gayle Lee Boone and Kayle Shaw Jr. aka
Mike Days with the a.dm:nition frcm the Court that such testim:my is not to be
considered as evidence against the co-defendant David Edward Albo. Under the
rules of evidence of the State of Utah, such testim:my and evidence is hearsay
unless there bas been evidence presented which proves to your satisfaction, and
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the declarant, Gayle Lee Boone, and the co-defend.!nl
David Edward Albo, were participating in a plan to ccmnit a crime and the statarent
~ relevant to the plan or its subject matter and was ma.de while the plan ~.ll1
existence and before its canplete execution or other termination. If you so rwd
you may consider arI:'f and all statements ma.de by the defendant Boone to Kayle ShaW
aka Mike Days as substantive evidence against the defendant Albo (R. 85).

2. This and exceptions (8) and (9) cover the admissibility of admissions by a p~r'.)
or by those by 'Nhose statements he is b0LU1d. Since "statement" includes non-ver,aconduct, the decision in State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285, VX>uld be
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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:o

,0 P.2d 285 (1941), applicable to these hearsay exceptions.

;se the court held that if hearsay is to be admissible against one
'.O

~

d

would be a co-planner of a crime under Rule 63 (9) the plan must

:established independent of statements.

The court stated:

While the declarations of an agent or a conspirator
may be used against his principal or co-conspirator,
when that relationship is established by proper
evidence, agency by reason of being a co-conspirator
cannot be proved by the declarations of the agent.
[citations ommitted] 120 P.2d at 310.
e primary reason for requiring this proof independent of the statement

·1

as given in State v. Erwin, supra,
[I]t would be begging the question to admit the
declarations of the agent because he is the agent
of his principal, and then prove that he was in fact
the agent of his principal because he so stated in
his declaration. 12 P.2d at 298.
'iis was put in a slightly different way in Glasser v. United States,

:l.!nt

ent

In that

j U.S.

60, 86 L.Ed. 680, 62 S.Ct. 457 (1941),
However, such declarations are admissible over the
objection of an alleged co-conspirator, who was not
present when they were made, only if there is proof
aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy.
[citations omitted] Otherwise, hearsay would
lift itself by its own boot straps to the level of
competent evidence. 315 U.S. at 74-75.
Since this is a determination of admissibility of evidence

:~be

made by the trial judge.

This requirement is provided in

:Jle 8 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:

When the qualification of a person to be a witness,
or the admissibility of evidence, or the existence
of a privilege is stated in these rules to be subject
to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition
is in issue, the issue is to be determined by ~he
judge, and he shall indicate to the parties which
one has the burden of producing evidence and the
burden of proof on such issue as implied by the rule
under which the question arises. The judge may hear
and determine such matters out of the presence or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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hearing of the jury, except that on the admissibility of a confession the judge, if requested,
shall hear and determine the question out of the
presence and hearing of the jury. But this rule
shall not be construed to limit the right of a party
to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to
weight or credibility.
The failure of the trial court to make this determination
as required in the Rules of Evidence obviously was error.

However, tol

make matters worse the trial court compounded the error by instructini a

the jury that they were to determine the admissibility of the evidence.'

This very issue was dealt with by the United States Court of Appeals :
for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d
718 (9th Cir. 1963).

In that case the court held that it is the

province of the judge to determine the admissibility of the evidence.
The reason for this is that such an instruction would require that the
jury find the defendant guilty before considering the evidence.
In an analogous situation the United States Supreme Court
held that it is improper to have a jury determine the voluntariness of
a defendant's confession and then determine the guilt or innocence of
that defendant.

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, (1964).

The court fol

that such a procedure violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
that:

The major reasons that the court gave for such a holding wE

First of all, if a jury is to determine the voluntariness of a

confession it will be impossible to tell if they found that the
confession was voluntary or involuntary on the record, thus precluding
appellate review of a defendant's substantial constitutional right.

3 . See footnote 2, supra.
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t

;econdly, the court reasoned that it would be highly possible for a jury
:o confuse the issues of voluntariness and truthfulness, resulting in
:he refusal to reject an involuntary confession, which was truthful,
:hus
1

resulting in a violation of the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment

rights.

Another analogous case is Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.

:o l13 (1968).
11

There the Supreme Court held that if the trial court

aenied a motion to sever and a witness was allowed to testify about

:e.1tatements the co-defendant made and when that co-defendant did not
:estify, then the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause of
l the Sixth Amendment were denied.
;ury

The court noted that even though the

was admonished to disregard the statements as to defendant Bruton,
The fact of the matter is that too often such
admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible
declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the
jurors. The admonition therefore becomes a futile
collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a
legal protection to defendants against whom such
a declaration should not tell.
The government should not have the windfall of
having the jury be influenced by evidence against
defendant which, as a matter of law, they should
not consider but which they cannot put out of
their minds. 391 U.S. at 129 quoting Delli Paoli
v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957). Frankfurter
J. dissenting.

rrth
WE

With these considerations in mind a jury

the possibility that

will be confused by refusing to disregard what they may decide

:obe truthful statements, and their inability to not consider such

ng

statements should they choose to find the statements inadmissible chis instruction was erroneous.

These errors were prejudicial, mandating a reversal of
:'1e judgment below.

This is because the hearsay statements were
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'!

inadmissible against the appellant and in all likelihood the
were used as evidence against the appellant.
could prove a

statementi~

All the evidence which :.2<

plan to commit a crime which is independent of the hea1.:n ~

say statements is outlined above.

The most damaging of this evidence 1ad

is Boone being in the appellant's car giving him the money.

The appel]1ef

1

testified that Boone was repaying a previous debt, absent the hearsay md
statements this evidence goes unrefuted.

Even if the jury chose to

'ei

disregard the appellant's testimony, the fact that the two men were in:ac
the car with the money makes the State's contention that they were

:en

dividing the gains of a drug sale nothing more than mere suspicion.

:he

"Evidenc.e which creates a mere suspicion of guilt as not enough.

Guilt~ns

may not be inferred from mere association", Glover v. United States,

:he

306 F.2d 594 (10th Cir., 1962).

Jef

Similarly, in White v. State, 451

S. W. 2d 497 (Tex. 1970), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that J\e

the evidence was insufficient to make a prima facie showing of possessr•h<
of narcodic paraphernalia.

The evidence, independent of the co-defenda 1st

hearsay statement was that White had thrown two capsules of heroin on :o·
the roof when he saw the police approach his apartment, and when the
paraphernalia for which he was charged with possessing was removed from:hi

a bathroom he shared and was displayed to White, he stated "That's my 10'
stuff".

Such evidence is much more inculpatory than two men being

present in a car with money after a narodics sale.

This is because

~n

:h

there was an admission of ownership and the paraphernalia was in a
area within the defendant's control.

Even if the evidence of the two

in the car with the money is taken in conjunction with the evidence
that the appellant drove into the parking lot shortly before the
transaction, it is not sufficient to establish that there was a plan
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to commit a crime.

This is because mere association, United Stat~

:h

nti~·

497 F. 2d 130 (5th Cir., 1974) or presence, People v. Braly, 532

:.2d 325 (Colo., 1975) is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.

n United States v. Oliva, supra, there was evidence that the defendant
ar•
e ·,ad followed a co-conspirator into a parking lot of an apartment shortly
en1efore a drug sale took place' waited while the transaction took place'
md attempted to drive away when he realized the co-conspirator was
:eing arrested.

This was held to be insufficient to establish the prima

in :acie showing required for the admission of the co-conspirator's state:ents against the defendant.
:he defendant enter
ilt~nside

In People v. Braly, supra, agents observed

a house where a drug sale was set up.

The agents

the house were told to wait in another room at the same time when

:here was a knock on the door.
Jefendant' s entering

That knock corresponded to the

the house as observed by the agents outside

at :he co-defendant then produced some narcotics to sample for the agents

ssr•ho were in the house.

This evidence was held to be insufficient to

nda1stablish the prima facie showing required for the admission of the

n :o-defendant' s statements against the defendant.

The evidence in the

:ase at hand is analogous to the evidence in those cases just described.

rom:he appellant was in the area but nobody saw any drugs passed between
Joane and the appellant.
~n

Kayle Shaw never spoke with the appellant,

fact he did not even know the appellant's name (T. 121), and finally,

:he agents never saw Boone approach the appellant's car until the arrest
;as made.
Therefore, there was not even a prima facie showing that
:he appellant had formed a plan to commit a crime.

Absent this showing

:.1e evidence was inadmissible as to the appellant.

It was error for

~

court to allow the jury to consider this evidence against the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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appellant in any way, let alone in the erroneous way in which the court de
instructed the jury.

The hearsay statements were the most damaging

evidence that the State had against the appellant.

i

As shown above,

without these statements the State could not even make a prima facie
showing that there was a plan to distribute narcodics for value.

There ir

is a high probability that without this evidence the jury's verdict

de

would have been different, State v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah, 1977) Ur

The errors were prejudicial, the case must be reversed and remanded to fc
the Third District Court for a new trial.

nE

POINT I I

ar

THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE WAS DENIED WHEN THE TRIAL
COURT ALLOWED THE JURY TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENTS AFTER THE
COURT HAD DENIED APPELLANT ' S MOTION TO SEVER THE TRIALS.

st

or

cc

a pre-trial motion to sever based on the Confrontation Clause of Articl

tr
tr

I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah and the Sixth Amendment of

tc

Appellant, who was tried jointly with Gayle Lee Boone, file

the United States Constitution as that clause is interpreted in
v. United States, supra.

~ p<

The motion was denied (R. 48).

pe

The facts relevant here are that Kayle Shaw, Jr. testified fi
that the co-defendant Boone made statements that implicated the appelli
The most cruicial of these statements were that the person who would be ag
delivering the narcodics would be driving a "white Continental" and whe cc
such a car pulled into the lot the co-defendant identified the appellan
for Shaw (T. 47).

The appellant registered a continuing objection to

the admission of these statements (T. 22).

The court did not make anv

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 12 -

tr
tr
tr

determination on the admissibility of these statements, rather that
issue was left to the jury (R. 85).
The impropriety of this instruction and its effect on the
appellant are discussed in detail in Point I, supra.

The impropriety

e in having a jury determine the voluntariness of a confession then

determine guilt or innocence, was ruled on by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Jackson v. Denno, supra.

In that case, the court gave

four reasons why it is improper to have a jury determine the voluntariness of a confession.

As can be seen by their content, these reasons

apply equally well to having the jury determine the admissibility of
any kind of evidence.

The reasons are as follows:

The content of the

statements at issue may affect the jury's consideration on admissibility
on appeal, there is no record to indicate whether the jury found the
confessions to be admissible or inadmissible; if the jury did find
e the evidence to be inadmissible, then it would be unsound to believe
1 that guilt is reliably determined; and the jury may find it difficult
to understand the policy forbidding reliance on statements of other
parties.

To sum up these reasons, there is a danger that notions

pertaining to the guilt of a defendant will infect the jury's
finding of the admissibility of the evidence.
Normally, the questions of the admissibility of hearsay
ie

against a co-defendant and the need to grant a severance are not of

ie constitutional magnitude.
in

But when it is a co-defendant who has made

the statement that is admissible against himself, but not against
the other co-defendant and that first co-defendant does not testify,
then a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
-13-
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Amendment and under Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of
Utah are violated, Bruton v. United States, supra.
In Bruton v. United States, supra, the confession of the
co-defendant was found to be inadmissible against Bruton by the trial
court.

The trial court instructed the jury not to consider the con-

fession against Bruton.

The co-defendant refused to take the stand

and Bruton claimed that his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confronta
tion Clause had been denied.

The court began its analysis by citing

Pointer v. Texas,380 U.S. 400 (1965) for the proposition,
'That the right of cross-examination is
included in the right of an accused in a
criminal case to confront the witnesses against
him' [which is] secured by the Sixth Amendment.
391 U.S. at 126.
The major reason for the confrontation clause, the court noted, is to
give a defendant charged with a crime an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses against him.

This reasoning was followed in Douglas v.

Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).

In that case the prosecutor read into

evidence the purported confession of a person charged in the same
incident but tried separately after that witness had exercised his
privilege against self incrimination.

The court held that effective

confrontation is possible only if a statement is affirmed by the
speaker.
After noting that the Confrontation Clause requires that
a defendant have the right to cross-examine witnesses against him, th<
court in Bruton v. United States, supra, held that under certain
circumstances, as in the case at hand, it is not reasonably possible'
a jury to follow the court's instructions.

The court found that an
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instruction does not wipe the effect of an admission by one co-defendant

:rom the juror's minds when they are considering the guilt or innocence
if a second co-defendant.

Because of this, the admonition becomes

othing more than a futile collection of words.

1

The court then held

chat the government should not have the windfall of having the jury
~fluenced

by evidence against the defendant which the jurors should

-iot consider, but which the jurors cannot put out of their minds.
The court then analogized the problem with admissions by
co-defendant to the determination of the voluntariness of a confession

a

as

was ruled as in Jackson v. Dermo, supra.

The court found that it

is harder to disregard an admission by a co-defendant in a joint trial
than it is for a jury to disregard a confession found to be involuntary.
The reasoning the court gave for this was:

The involuntary confession

is out of the case, but the co-defendant's admission is still admissible,
because the statement is admissible for only limited purposes, it must
still enter into the jury's deliberations;

it is very difficult for

the trained lawyer, let alone for jurors to perform the mental gymnastics
required to separate the evidence into separate intellectual boxes; and
f~thermore,

the jurors will have an even greater problem separating

'the truthfulness of a statement and its application to a co-defendant
'.han in the voluntary confession determiantion when truthfulness is not
to be considered.
In the case at hand there are even stronger reasons to find
that the appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated.

'.o!'ne same considerations of the statements being admissible against the
~-defendant Boone and the problems the jury would have disregarding

'.iese statements with respect to the appellant are all present here
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as they were in Bruton v. United States, supra.

But these problems

are compounded by the error in instructing the jury and all of the
Jackson v. Denno, supra, problems that are inherent in such an instructiia
These problems are summarized by Justice Brennan in his
majority opinion in Bruton v. United States, supra,
Nevertheless, as was recognized in Jackson v.
Denno, supra, there are some contexts in which
tne'"""risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of
failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. [citations ommitted]
Such a context is presented here, where the
powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements
of a co-defendant, who stands accused side-byside with the defendant, are deliberately spread
before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are
the incriminations de-vastating to the defendant
but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact
recognized when accomplices do take the stand
and the jury is instructed to weigh their
testimony carefully given the recognized motivation
to shift blame onto others. The unreliability
of such evidence is intolerably compounded when
the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify
and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was
against such threats to a fair trial that the
Confrontation Clause was directed.
[Citation anitted, footnotes ommitted] 391 U.S. at
135-136.

th
de

Br
re

ha1

te:

in

thE

Since the error in this case was of a constitutional

Svi

magnitude, it is presumed to be prejudicial unless the State is able t:
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute tot~
appellant's conviction.

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

See also, State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P. 2d 639 (1970); anc
State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah, 1977).

The reasonable d0ubt that

the error was harmless is found in the erroneous instruction given tc
the jury and the high probability that the jury was unable to follow
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pri

1

it,

see Point I, supra.

The judgment of the court below must be

reversed and the case remanded to the Third District Court for the
appellant to receive a new trial, separate from any charges against
~e

co-defendant, Boone.
POINT III
BY REFUSING TO REQUIRE A WITNESS' FORMER ATTORNEY
TO TESTIFY AFTER THE ATTORNEY CLAIMED THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BECAUSE A CLIENT'S PLAN TO COMMIT
PERJURY IS EXCEPTED FROM THAT PRIVILEGE.
In the course of Kayle Shaw's testimony it was established

that he had three charges of aggravated robbery, felonies of the first
degree, pending against him (T. 20).

It was also established that

kadley P. Rich of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association had
represented Shaw on these charges (T. 74).

Shaw testified that he

1ad retained private counsel whom he had just fired (T. 74).

Shaw also

testified that he never stated that he was willing to perjure himself
in trial on the aggravated robbery charges (T. 362).

Mr. Rich claimed

the attorney-client privilege pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (T. 364).

The court allowed Mr. Rich to claim the

privilege for Shaw (T. 364).
There is no question that the assertion of the privilege

- 17 -
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4

fit within the general rule described in Rule 26(1)
Rules of Evidence.

of the Utah

is

However, the privilege may not be properly claimed is

if it fits within the exceptions applicable to that rule.

The

important exception here is is Rule 26(2)(a) which provides:
Such privileges shall not extend (a) to a communication
if the judge finds that sufficient evidence, aside
from the communication, has been introduced to warrant
a finding that the legal service was sought or obtained
in order to enable or aid the clinet to commit or plan
to commit a crime or a tort.
It is obvious that in order to assert this exception "the secret must
be told in order to be kept," but this is a reasonable method of reconciling the competing policies of the attorney-client privilege and
the search for truth in a trial, A v. District Court of Second Judicia:

Co

20

att

an

thE

thE

the

anc

cot

District, 550 P.2d 315 (Colorado, 1976).
Since perjury is a crime in Utah

5

, the plan to cotm:nit perj

4. General Rllle. Subject to Rllle 37 and except as otherwise provided by paragraphl
of this rule camruni.cations found by the judge to have been between lawyer and his
client in the course of that relationship and in professional confidence, are priviJ
and such a client has a privilege (a) if he is the witness to refuse to disclose aI11
such camruni.cation, and (b) to prevent his lawyer from disclosing it, and (c) to p!1I
any other witness from disclosing such ccmrunication if it caire to the knowledge of
such witness (i) in the course of its transmittal between the client and the lawyer
or (ii) in a manner not reasonably to be anticipated by the client, or (iii) as ar~
of a breach of the lawyer-client relationship. The privilege may be claimed by the
client in person or by his lawyer, or if incanpetent, by his guardian, or if dece4Saj
by his personal representative. The privilege available to a corporation or assoc~
tenn:inates upon dissolution.
'
5. 76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements. - A person is guilty ofi
felony of the second degree if in any official proceeding:
(1) He makes a false material statement under oath or affirmation
or swears or affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and he does
not believe the statement to be true· or
(2) He makes inconsist~t mater.-al statements under oath or affi.r!!atin
bc;>th within the period of limitations, one of which is false and not believed by 131
him to be true. In a prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or
proved which or the statemmts is false but only that one or the other was false of
and not believed by the defendant to be true.
in

- 18 -
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is covered by Rule 26 (2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, such a plan

lis not privileged.

The only previous occasion that the Utah Supreme

Court has had to rule in this question was in People v. Mahon, 1 Utah
205 (1875).

In that case, the defendant claimed error because an

attorney was required to testify about a plan to commit forgery because
an attorney was required to testify about a plan to commit forgery that
the

defendant had consulted that attorney about.

The court held that

the

attorney' client privilege could not be asserted.

the

general rule that "confidential communications between the attorney

The court stated

and client are not to be revealed at any time" 1 Utah at 208, the
court then reasoned:
a:

rj

11

::.

:11

:~

But do all matters come within the scope of professional
employment? Are there not matters of such a nature,
that the law will not permit the relation of Attorney and
Client to exist in regard to them? While a member of the
Bar may be Counsel for, and keep the secrets of, one who
has committed a crime, can he be permitted to sustain
any such relation to one who proposes to commit a crime?
Where he to attempt to give aid and assistance, in the
case last approved, would not the law regard him as an
accessory before the fact, rather than as a Counselor
at Law? Is it not the duty of a member of the Bar, as
much as of any other citizen, to expose contemplated
crime, so as, if possible, to prevent it? What do the
books say?

!

~

I

Lord Chief Baron Gilbert says: "Where the original
ground of communication is malum in se, as if he be
consulted on an intention to commit a forgery or perjury, this can never be included within the compass
of professional confidence; being equally contrary to
his duty in his profession, his duty as a citizen, and
as a man." (1 Gilbert's Law of Ev. 277). 1 Utah at 209.
More recently, in State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d
136 (1970), the Supreme Court of Kansas found there was no violation
of the attorney-client privilege when the court-appointed attorney

informed the Court that his client was uncooperative and planned to
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commit perjury.

We perceive nothing violative of the confidentiality
inherent in the attorney-client relation by Mr.
Anderson's making known to the court defendant's
avowed intention of presenting perjured testimony.
While as a general rule counsel is not allowed to
disclose information imparted to him by his client
or acquired during their professional relation,
unless authorized to do so by the client himself
[citation omitted] the announced intention of a
client to commit perjury, or any other crime is
not included within the confidences which an
attorney is bound to respect. 468 P.2d at 141.

I
I

L

The court held:

This evidence was obviously admissible because its purpose
6
was to impair the credibility of a witness
and in the course of his
testimony that witness had denied making such a statement (T. 72) 7.
Consequently it was error for the court to allow Mr. Rich to assert ti
attorney-client privilege, thus preventing the appellant from

effecti~

impeaching the credibility of the State's primary witness.
The error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable
probability that if it had not been commited there would have been a
result more favorable to the appellant, State v. Simmons, supra.

Thi;

is because the defense was that the co-defendant did not sell the nar·
cotics to Kayle Shaw, rather, he was collecting a past debt from Shaw
and using that money to repay the appellant.
was

In order to do this it

crucial that Shaw was shown to be a person who's testimony compl:I

lacked even a modicum of credibility.

To do this it was of the utmos:

6. Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for the~
of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the ix:·
calling him may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerniilg any stater.::
of conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility.
7. Rule 22(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Extrinsic evidence of prior contradi~·
tory statements, 'Whether oral or written ma.de bv the witness mav in the discretl'·
of the judge be excluded unless the witn~ss was ~o examined whlle. testifying as tc
give him an opportunity to identify, explain or deny the statement.
·
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~ortance
0

that the appellant be able to show that Shaw was willing

perjury himself.

After making this showing the inference could be

ade that Shaw was willing to lie under oath; therefore, he would be
tore than willing to lie about buying drugs from the appellant, that
nference may have been enough to create a reasonable doubt of the
1ppellant' s guilt in the minds of the jurors.

The error was

1rejudicial, absent this error there is a reasonable probability that
he verdict may have been more favorable.

The judgment must be reversed

md the case remanded to the Third District Court for a new trial.
POINT IV
THE FAILURE TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL TO ALLOW THE
APPELLANT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF A CRUICIAL
WITNESS DENIED THE APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR WITNESSES AS GUARANTEED IN THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH.
In the course of re-direct examination the prosecutor elicited
the following testimony with respect to the aggravated robbery charges
that the witness, Kayle Shaw, was facing at the time:

Q.

And what was the name of your lawyer at that time?

A.

Carolyn Nichols.

Q.

And did you have personal contact with her at that time?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And why did you discharge her at that time?

A.

She was defending Louis Rashado, somebody I had set up.

Q.

Has Mr. Rashada been charged with the distribution of

narcotics also?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

And she is representing him?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was there any other reason that you fired her other

than this conflict of interest?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what's that?

A.

Because I thought she would be a setup because she

has been talking to Mr. Boone and several other people.

Q.

Did she inform you of that?

A.

Yes.

(T. 142)

On re-cross examination, defense counsel established that
Shaw and his attorney were the only persons present when the witness
decided that she was going to set him up (T. 154).

Shaw also denied

that his attorney had accused him of lying to set people up (T. 155)
It was also established that the subject matter of these conversation:
would affect the determination of the guilt or innocence of the appeL
and of the co-defendant, Boone (T. 155).

Kayle Shaw then expressly

waived any privilege he had with respect to the confidentiality of
these communications with his attorney (T. 164).
was taken on Wednesday, June 15, 1977.

All of this testimorJ

The next day, Thursday, June

16, 1977, defense counsel moved for a continuance until Monday, June
20, 1977 (T. 401).

The basis for the motion was to secure the attend~

of Carolyn Nichols, the attorney with whom Kayle Shaw had the afore·
mentioned conversation.

Ms. Nichols was in Texas and therefore

unavailable until June 20, 1977 (T. 401).
after arguments

The motion was denied

the jury retired for their deliberations on the
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(T . .J

afternoon of Friday, June 17, 19 77 .
In Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska, 1976), the
)upreme Court of Alaska ruled on a situation which was the same as that
:n the case at hand.
~rder

There the defendant was convicted of first degree

by running over a person in a car.

The car was then set on fire.

Tue next day the defendant pointed the car out to a friend while they
·1ere driving in the area.
from the burned out car.

The two of them then removed some articles
The state's theory was that the defendant

\new where the car was and directed his friend to it.

The friend

testified that he did not see the car at the place where the defendant
.t saw it.

The defendant in that case disclaimed any knowledge of
the homicide, and testified that he could see the burned out car from
·the road.
m:

Since the wreckage had been moved, a police officer who

conducted the investigation was called by the defendant to give the

{,exact location of where the car was found and he testified that it

10

could be seen from the road.

The officer's attendance could not be

secured immediately because he was out of town and was unable to fly
'lto the location of the trial due to bad whether.

The trial was con-

~

tinued for one day, but the weather did not break and the court refused

!

to grant any further continuances and the trial was concluded.

id~ defendant was convicted as charged.

The

After analyzing a great number

of cases, the Alaska Court found seven factors that must be met before
a court grants a mid-trial continuance to secure the attendance of a
.J.'
<ltness.

These factors are:
1.

. 1; 8
The evi d ence must b e materia

Requirement given in State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P.2d 112 (1941).
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2.

The evidence cannot be elicited from any other source

3.

The evidence must not be cumulative;

4.

It is probable that the witness can be secured in a

reasonable time;
5.

There will be little inconvenience to the court and

t

others;
6.

The requesting party must have acted dilligently and
9
in good faith to secure the attendance of that witness;
and
7.

There is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony
would a f feet the jury s ver d'ict. 10
I

The Alaska Court found that all these factors were present.

On that

basis the court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to hai

compulsory process was denied because he was not allowed to call favor
able witnesses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
The materiality of the testimony that Ms. Nichols would
give was established by Kayle Shaw.

He stated the knowledge that Ms

Nichols had would probably affect the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the appellant (T. 155).

Furthermore, such evidence wouli

be considered for substantive purposes rather than for simply assessii
Shaw's credibility, as is made clear in the note following Rule 63(1)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

9.

Requirement given in State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 P.447 (1906).

10. This is the general standard for prejudice, State v. S:imzvns, supra.
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Shaw also testified that he and Ms. Nichols were the only
?ersons present during the course of the conversation (T. 154).
Consequently, there were no alternative sources of information.
Ms. Nichols' testimony would not have been cummulative.
There had been no showing that Shaw had made other prior inconsistent
statements.
client

By

privilege

appellant

from

allowing
the
showing

Mr.

court
that

Rich
has
Shaw

to

claim

previously
had

made

the

attorney-

prevented
such

the

state-

men ts.

The witness could have been served a subpoena in a reasonable time.

As noted above the appellant made the request on Thursday,

June 16, 1977; the witness would have been available on Monday, June

,JQ, 1977.

Since the courts are not open on Saturday and Sunday, Friday,

June 17, 1977, would have been the only day that the trial would have
to have been continued.
mreasonable.

What amounts to a one day delay is hardly

The reasonableness of this delay is reinforced if this

court takes judicial notice, pursuant to Rules 9

11

11. Rule 9: (1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party, of the
in force in this state, and of such
specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge as are so universally
'mcwn that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute.
(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party, of (a) the
'.lllIIDn law, constitution and public statutes of every other state, territory and
Jurisdiction of the United States, and (b) private acts and resolutions of the Congress
of the United States and of the legislature of this state, and duly enacted ordinances
and duly published orders, rules and regulations of governJ:1E1.tal subdivisions or departlEnts or agencies of this state (and duly published orders, rules and regulations of
the departments or agencies of the United States), and (c) the laws of foreign countries,
and (d) such facts as are so generally known or of such COIIIIDI1 notoriety within the
t:intorial jurisdiction of the court that they carmot reasonably be the sub~ect of
Gi.spute, and (e) specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are
:aiiable of imrediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources
'f indisputable accuracy.
(3) Judicial notice shall be taken of each matter specified in paragraph
') of this rule if a party requests it, and (a) furnishes the judge suffic~ent
J\l:onnauon to enable him properly to canply with the request and (b) has given each
idverse party suchSponsored
notice
asQuinney
theLawjudge
mayfor require
toby enable
the adverse
party to
by the S.J.
Library. Funding
digitization provided
the Institute of Museum
and Library Services
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1camm law, constitution and public statutes

and 12(3)

12

of the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the fact that it is a

common practice in the Third Judicial District to continue a trial f::1

Thursday to Monday if the judge hearing the case is to take the arrai;:.:
ment and sentencing calendar on Friday.
These same considerations apply to the inconvenience tha:
a continuance over a Friday would cause to the court and to others.
In Salazar v. State, supra, this consideration was weighed against
the possible prejudice to the defendant's substantive rights.

The

rights involved here as were involved in Salazar v. State, supra, an:
the appellant's Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process of Law as
that clause applies the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amend·
ment of the United State's Constitution to the states and the rights
guaranteed in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
Unquestionably, a one day delay does not so seriously affect the neec
for efficiency and prompt disposition of criminal cases that these
substantive rights must be denied.
Also, there is no question that the appellant acted
and in good faith

dill::~

in trying to secure the attendance of the witnes;

An attempt to subpoena Ms. Nichols was made on the same afternoon oii

date that Kayle Shaw testifed and the need for Ms. Nichols to testif;
was made apparent (T. 401).

The continuance was requested the day

following the attempt to subpoena Ms. Nichols.

It hardly would have

been possible for the appellant to act more dilligently in trying tc
secure the attendance of this witness.
Finally, there is a reasonable likelihood that the testi:-~
would have affected the jury's verdict.

As has previously been arg-;::.

by preventing the appellant from challenging the credibility of Ka:<
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
12. Rule 12(3):
The Library
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Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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errors.judicially noticed by the judge
of lrI'J mtter specified in Rule
9 whether
or
not
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i

Shaw the trial court denied the appellant his only defense;
;1rhat

that being

Kayle Shaw had liked about buying drugs from the co-defendant and

:.:;as repaying the co-defendant for an old debt which the co-defendant
,as to repay to the appellant.

The prior inconsistent statements would

allow the jury to see that Shaw must have been lying in making at least
one of the inconsistent statements and from this, the jury may infer
chat Shaw was lying about buying narcotics.

The evidence would also

:iave been considered substantively in determining the guilt or innocence

: of the appellant.

Obviously, there is a reasonable doubt that this

:estimony may have been harmless, Chapman v. California, supra.
Since all the factors delineated in Salazar v. State, supra,
have been met in the case at hand, the appellant has been denied his
right to call favorable witnesses as required by the compulsory process

: clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
supra.

Washington v. Texas,

The judgment and verdict must be reversed and the case remanded

::Ho the Third District Court for a new trial.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
ALLOWING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF OTHER
BAD ACTS BY THE CO-DEFENDANT.
In the course of the direct examination of Kayle Shaw, Jr.
'.he prosecutor elicited statements that connected the co-defendant,
;avle Boone, with other bad acts and statements that disparaged the
:.~:a-defendant's character (T.
~~-defendant

39, 140 and 142).

At no time did the

introduce any evidence about his character.
On direct examination of Shaw by the prosecutor, the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 27 -

following exchange took place:

Q.

So this conversation took place over about forty

minutes?
A.

About forty minutes.

Q.

Did you have any conversation with Boone -

Mr. Boone

about purchasing any other narcotics from him?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

About what time did that take place in the course of

these conversations?
A.

About ten to seven.

Q.

And what did that consist of?

A.

Angel Dust.

Q.

And just tell me what you said and what he said.

A.

He told me he

st;l~

ha& an ounce of Angel Dust down

in his crib.
Q.

Now, can you translate that for us what "an ounce of

Angel Dust in his crib" means?
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, at this point I am going to
interpose an objection. I have a motion to make outside
the presence of the Jury. I ask the Court allow us to
do so at this time.
As counsel for the co-defendant pointed out and as is re·
fleeted in the record, a mistrial had been granted the day before thi>
exchange on the basis that Shaw had volunteered a statement on cross·
examination that he had purchased narcotics from the co-defendant pri:I
to the date of the purchase that is the subject of this case (T. 40,
R. 50).

Later, in redirect examination of Shaw by the prosecutor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 28 -

~e

following exchange took place:

Q.

Could you have made the buy from Mr. Boone on the

27th had you told him the truth that you were working
as an undercover agent?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

You couldn't -

A.

If I told him?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

I doubt if I would be alive right now.

I said, could you have bought from him?

MR. KELLER: Your Honor, I object to the response. It's
unresponsive.
It's unduly prejudicial.
I have a motion
to make outside the presence of the Jury and I would ask
the Court to allow me to do that at the proper recess.
THE COURT: Very well. The objection is sustained and the
answer is stricken and the Jury admonished to disregard the
answer of the witness.
(T. 140)
Later in redirect examination the prosecutor elicited a statement from
Shaw that he had fired his attorney because she was working with the
co-defendant and she said the co-defendant was going to set Shaw up
(T. 142).

Out of the presence of the jury a motion for a mistrial was

denied (T. 146) .
With respect to the first statement about the co-defendant
possessing other drugs, there was a motion for a mistrial that was
>denied (T. 45).

In denying the motion the court seemed to indicate

that it was improper for the statement to be elicited, but he felt
:Hhat the evidence was not prejudicial (T. 43, 45), the same basis was
~~n

for the second motion for a mistrial (T. 146).

did not give

The Court

any instruction to disregard the statement when the jury

ad returned (T. 46, 147).
The standard for the trial court to use in determining
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when a mistrial should be granted is given in Justice Maughan's
dissenting opinion in State v. Maestas, 560 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977).
test is:
Upon a motion for mistrial the court must weigh the dang
of prejudice, to the defense, against the practicability
of reducing or eliminating that danger by choosing a
new jury. The essence of judicial discretion in dealing
with a misadventure is to so manage matters so as to
control the danger of jury prejudice, to the extent
practicable [footnote omitted], 560 P.2d at 346, Maughan
J. dissenting.
As for the danger of prejudice, the factors to consider
are whether statements as a whole cast the co-defendant and appellan
in a bad light.

The statements about other drugs and firing his

attorney appear to have been elicited intentionally.

Those statement

were never stricken and the jury was not instructed to disregard then
Finally, it must be remembered that the statements were made duringt
testimony of the first witness.
Evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs is inadmissible
unless it fits within one of the exceptions to that rule.

Rule 55

of the Utah Rules of Evidence is the codification of that rule.

It

provides:
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is
inadmissible to prove his dispostion to commit crime
or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he
committed another crime or civil wrong on another
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48,
such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some
other material fact including absence of mistake or
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge or identity.
The only exceptions that fit this case would be to prove intent or

plan.

Both the intent and plan in the case at hand were to distribute

a controlled substance for value.

The statement that the co-defendar'
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was in possession of a different type of substance has little or no
he probative value in the case at hand.

It only shows that the co-defendant

was allegedly violating the law allowing the jury to infer on the
er basis of the co-defendant's bad character that he made the sale in the

case at hand.

Under Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence such evidence

is clearly inadmissible.

With respect to the second remark, admittedly

the court did all that it could to reduce its prejudicial nature.
~evertheless,
~st

the jury did hear the remark and its resulting prejudice

be considered in conjuction with the previous remark.

The sub-

stance of the final remark is that the co-defendant is interfering
with Shaw's right to counsel.

This does nothing but cast the appellant

t>

in a bad light as the statement would not be admissible for any purpose
m.

ooder Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

tn•
The case law provides examples of when statements are so
prejudicial in and of themselves to require the reversal of a case
on appeal.

Evidence that the defendant had been charged with a crime

in the past, even though never tried on the charge is prejudicial error,
State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961).

Testimony about

a prior arrest for a similar crime than was charged required reversal,

State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407 (1963).

Since the statement

here involved acts that were illegal and somewhat related to the
charge in the case at hand they were just as prejudicial as the remarks

in State v. Dickson, supra, and State v. Kazda, supra.
Another factor that substantially contributes to the prejudicial nature of the remarks was that some of them had been intentionally
re elicited from the witness.
' -~ey were raised,

This is easily seen by the context in which

(T. 39, 142) and the prosecutor's arguments to make
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the statement admissible (T. 40-41, 42-43, 144-145).

The rule given

by this court is that a mistrial is to be granted when the prosecutor a
intentionally elicits inadmissible statements from a witness.

In

State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P. 2d 112 (1941), this Court statei, t
Were it shown to be an attempt to get in evidence the
prejudicial reference to another crime, such purpose
might well have moved the court to declare a mistrial
not only on the ground of prejudice but as a proper
disapproval of such tactics.
This rule is followed in State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d

01

323 (1955); and in State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221 (Utah, 1976).

l<

State cannot claim that the prosecutor lacked notice.

The

This is because

WE

a mistrial had been granted on the previous day because Shaw had made ti
a statement about another drug purchase from the co-defendant.

It

ti

is quite obvious that evidence of a prior sale is much more probative be
of the intent or plan to sell narcotics then a statement ab out presen:
possession of narcotics or that the co-defendant had interfered with

a

the witness' relationship with his attorney.

Cc

There was further prejudice because the court failed to
instruct the jury to disregard the first and third statements (T. 46,
147).

Without an instruction of that nature the evidence is left in

for the jury's consideration, State v. St. Clair, supra.

Such an insiiJ

tion also tends to cure the prejudcial nature of the statement, ~
v. Hartman, supra;

State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 36 7, 517 P. 2d 1322 (Jll

The final factor that contributed to the prejudicial nature
of the statements was the time at which they were elicited.
The first was elicited in the first several hours of test'.·
mony (T. 39).

The second and third statements came on the morning o:

the second day of trial.

Since they came at times when relatively
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little other information had been given to the jury, the appellant
and co-defendant were cast in a bad light from the outset.

r

The prejudice

attaching to the co-defendant also applies to the appellant because
ed, the court instructed the jury to apply the co-defendant's statements

against the appellant should the jury find they were engaged in a plan
to commit a crime (R. 85).
When all of these factors are taken together, the nature
of the statements, the intentional eliciting of the statements, the

lack of an instruction from the court and the time in the trial when they
were made, all add up to their being substantially prejudicial.

1se

le the statements were made so early in the trial -

the very first witness -

•e been minimal.

Since

both were made by

the inconvenience of a mistrial would have

The trial court should have granted a mistrial.

The standard for review of an erroneous failre to grant

~nt

a mistrial was given in State v. Hodges, supra.

1

In that case this

Court stated:

I,

I

istiJ

:e

:ure

;t'.·

Nevertheless, the processes of justice should not be
distorted simply for the purpose of censuring a mistake.
The critical inquiry should be whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the incident so prejudiced
the jury that in its absence there might have been a
different result. Due to his advantaged position and
consistent with his responsibilities as the authority
in charge of the trial, the inquiry is necessarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
He should view such an episode in the light of the
of the total proceeding, and if he thinks that there
has been such prejudice that there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant cannot have a fair and
impartial determination of his guilt or innocence, he
should of course grant a mistrial. But inasmuch ~s
this is his primary responsibility, when he has.given
due consideration and ruled upon the matter, this
court on review should not upset his ruling unless
it clearly appears that he has abused his discretion.
[footnotes omitted] 517 P.2d at 1324.
- 33 -
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With regard to the nature of the discretion of the trial judge, this
court has stated "if this discretion is reasonably used, and is not
shown to have been abused, arbitrary, or capricious, the judgment
of the trial court should not be disturbed", [footnote omitted].
State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 (1975).
The trial court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner
When the trial in this case was originally commenced the court granteo
a mistrial because Kayle Shaw stated that he had made a prior purchase
of narcotics from the co-defendant.
prejudicial.

Such a statement is highly

The effect of the statements here taken standing alone or

in combination is just as prejudicial as the statement made that result
in the first mistrial.

The trial court's two decisions cannot be recon

ciled and consequently must be regarded as arbitrary and capricious.
The judgment must be reversed and the case remanded to the Third Distri1
Court for a new trial.
POINT VI
IN CLOSING ARGUMENT THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT BY COMMENTING ON THE CO-DEFENDANI' FAII.TIKZ ID
TESTIFY A..'l\ffi BY PRESENTING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO
THE JURY AND THIS MISCONDUCT RESULTED IN PREJUDICE
TO THE APPELLANI.
In the course of the rebuttal portion of the prosecutor's
argument to the jury, the prosecutor made the following remarks:
[Kayle Shaw] is given his presumption of innocence
and that rides with him until he is tried on August
the 1st. Counsel for some reason opened this and
I am even very, very reluctant to go into it but it
is still open.
He read the instruction about the defendant not
testifying and not creating a presumption against
him and he said the reason why the defendant did not
testify - he said I am a skillful prosecutor and
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he

I would have had a chance to cross-examine
him. No question about that. I would suggest
that maybe that is the reason. I don't know but,
you know, Kayle Shaw testified and Kayle Shaw was
subjected to cross-examination for almost two and
a half hours by two very skillful attorneys. He
submitted himself to cross-examination and he
succeeded. Succeeded one hundred percent in that
cross-examination. Kayle Shaw is a criminal. I
don't know, because he had some - he wasn't convicted of the offense that he had admitted on the
stand he committed: The possession of narcotics,
LSD. Sixty-eight hits of LSD is a heck of a lot
less than a thousand dollars of Phencyclidine,
animal tranquilizer, as you heard the chemist
tesify. A thousand dollars an ounce. Man, how
many times that could be cut and distributed and
redistributed. A thousand dollars and it is hard
to believe that an ounce of any type of - it is
even more expensive than gold. Pretty expensive
stuff.
Well, because Kayle Shaw is caught with sixty-eight
hits of acid in his car and some marijuana he is
a "criminal." We are dealing, if I can use the
phrase, with bigger crooks than Kayle Shaw on a
thousand dollars an ounce worth of PCP or
Phencyclidine.
(T. 483-484)
The argument of defense counsel that the prosecutor claimed

he was responding to was:

The defendant in any criminal case as the Court has
informed you has an absolute right not to take the
stand and testify if he does not want to. That's a
Constitutional Right and the Court has instructed you
that the mere fact that a defendant has not availed
himself of the privilege which the law gives him
should not prejudice him in any way. It should not
be considered as any indication either of his guilt or
his innocence. The failure of the defendant to
testify is not even a circumstance against him and
no presumption of guilt can be indulged in the minds
of the Jury. Why? Because a defendant may be satisfied
with the evidence as it has been presented. The
defendant may have other reasons. As you can see, Mr
Yocum is a skilled prosecutor, a skilled cross-examiner
and it is - there are numerous reasons why the defendant
may not want to testify and it is for that reaso~ that
the law - the Court instructs vou that the law in our
system of justice is that you may not even assume that
he is guilty because he as not testifed. The burden at
all times remains upon the State.
(T. 458)
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Although counsel for the appellant did cormnent on the fact
that the co-defendant had not taken the stand, he did so within the
bounds of Constitutional Law.

The prosecutor's comments however, were,

clearly comments intended to cause the jury to draw adverse conclusions
as to why the defendant did not testify.
It was an unfavorable comment on the co-defendant's excerci

I
I

of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

1

In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme
Court held that it is a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to allow a prosecutor to comment
in an accused's failure to testify.

The reasons that the court gave

for this holding were that such a comment, if allowed by the courts,
becomes the equivalent of an offer of evidence;

it is also a remanent

of the inquisitorial system of justice where an accused was forced to
testify or face a penalty of contempt.

Finally, the court reasoned t:.a.

in allowing such a comment the court would be penalizing a defendant
in a criminal case for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege.
In State v. Eaton, 569 P. 2d 1114 (Utah, 1977), this court

i1

found that a prosecutor's comments that the defense had not presented I

I

any evidence was a violation of both the Fifth Amendment to the Unitec
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of
Utah.

With respect to a prosecutor's closing argument the court

commented,
We approve and reaffirm that duty and privilege of
analyzing the whole evidence as a general proposition.
However, there is a point beyond which it must not
go in regard to the defendant's constitutional right
just referred to; and this includes that it should
not be impaired or destroyed by making comments on
the failure of the defendant to take the witness
stand. 569 P.2d at 1116
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The court went on to distinguish the case of State v.
~'

540 P.2d 949 (Utah, 1975).

In State v. Kazda, supra, the court

found that the prosecutor has a perogative and a duty to argue all
aspects of the case so long as there is no direct reference to the

1

failure to testify.

The court then recognized that,

Upon a fair analysis of the prosecutor's remarks
here, the conclusion cannot be escaped that it was
but a thinly disguised attempt to do indirectly what
the prosecutor knew could not properly be done
directly: that is, to comment on the fact that the
defendant had chosen not to take the witness stand; and
to persuade the jury to draw inferences as to his guilt
because of his exercise of that constitutional privilege.
[footnote omitted] 569 P.2d at 1116
Although counsel for appellant failed to object to this
comment this court is not precluded from reviewing this issue.

I

The

issue is reviewable with a showing of exceptional circumstances,
State v. Winger, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971).

In People v.

aPerez, 23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617 (1962), the Supreme Court of
California listed two circumstances under which it would review a
statement made in sUI!llllation for which there had been no objection
1

registered.

The first of these exceptions arises,
"Where the case is closely balanced and there is
doubt of the defendant's guilt, and the acts
of misconduct are such as to contribute materially
to the verdict, a miscarriage of justice results
requiring a reversal. [Citations omitted] The other
exception is where the act done or remark made is of
such character that a harmful result cannot be
obviated or cured bv an retraction of counsel or
instruction of the court. In such cases the misconduct will furnish ground for reversal of the judgment,
even where proper admonitions are given by the court"
373 P.2d at 627 quoting People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245,
324 P.2d 556 (1958).
g~ave

I

The harm that results from a comment on a defendant's refusal to take
"he

stand is a denial of his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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incrimination.

Griffin v. California, supra.

Even though the court

may instruct the jury to disregard the comment, it still has been
presented to the jury and the juror's attention has been directed to
it.

Psychologically, it would be nearly impossible for a juror to

disregard such a remark.

Consequently, it could be cured neither by

a retraction nor by an ins true ti on;

such an error is subject to revii

by this court even if there was no objection registered at trial.
Further error was committed by allowing the prosecutor tc
read from the transcript of the tape recording of the conversation
between Kayle Shaw and the co-defendant (T. 478).

Counsel objected t:

this reading (T. 487) because the court had previously refused to adr:t
the transcript into evidence (T. 333).
As was previously stated, the general rule is that counsE:
has both a privilege and a duty to analyze evidence in his argument
the jury State v. Eaton, supra, State v. Kazda, supra;

t:I

however, a

corollary to this rule is that counsel may not present matters to the
jury which were excluded from evidence.
F.2d 864 (D.C. 1968);

Garris v. United States, 39\1

People v. Perez, supra;

11 N.Y. 2d 290, 183 N.E. 2d 636 (1962);
App. 3d 919, 366 N.E. 2d 606 (1977).

I

People v. Rosenfeld, I

PeoEle v. Marthole, 51 Ill. '

See also 75 Am. Jur. 2d 331,

Trials §253.
The reason why such a presentation is not allowed is that

1

the jury may infer that this evidence was available and useful or
probative, but the defendant has prevented the jury from seeing or
hearing it.
(1969).

PeoEle v. Gilmer, llO Ill. App. 2d 73, 249 N.Ed. 2d 129

The probability that the jurors drew this inference and if :·i;
I

is taken in conjunction with the prosecutor's remark that the co-de:'°o e
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failed to take the stand leaves the strong impression that the defense
was hiding evidence from the jury.

Such an inference, in the context

of a case of this nature, can have an extremely prejudicial effect,
Since the whole defense was the co-defendant and the
appellant had been set up by Kayle Shaw, the inference that the appellant

'was trying to keep probative evidence from the jury would tend to
discredit that defense.

Since the defense of the appellant was dis-

credited by the error, there is a reasonable probability that there
would have been a result more favorable to the appellant if these
: errors had not been committed, State v. Simmons, supra; consequently,
~ 1 the error was prejudicial.

On this basis, the judgment must be reversed

and the case remanded to the Third District Court for a new trial.
POINT VII

'

ti

THE CUMMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED
ERRORS RESULTED IN A DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL.
'

In State v. St. Clair, supra, this Court found that when

'\the trial court commits a number of errors, each error in and of itself
was not prejudicial, the cummulative effect of the erros was prejudicial.
In the case at hand, Points I through VI all describe errors committed
by the trial court.
~

If this court finds that none of these errors are

prejudicial in and of themselves then it must consider the commu1 ative
effect of the errors.
The first of the groups of errors connect the appellant

:9 '.o t h e drug transaction
: ··l

through the co-defendant's hearsay statements.

· · ~e appellant was precluded from challenging these statements by cross,tr-1
·· examination because of the failure of the trial court to grant a
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severance.

The second group of errors precluded the appellant from

impeaching Kayle Shaw's testimony by failing to grant a continuance
and by refusing to make his former attorney testify.

This prevented

the jury from adequately assessing Kayle Shaw's credibility.,
set of errors involved the introduction into evidence of the
prior bad acts.

The thir

co-defen~

This evidence allows the jury to infer that the co-

defendant is a bad person and must have sold the narcodics and the
instruction given to the jury on hearsay (R. 85) would allow the jury
to apply the testimony against the appellant.

The fourth set of

erro~

relate to the prosecutor's closing argument which left the inference
that the defense as a whole was concealing evidence from the jury.

Unquestionably, there is a reasonable probability that this combinati;
of errors adversely affected the jury's verdict, State v. Simmons,

su:1

The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the case remandec
to the Third District Court.
POINT VIII
THE WARRANT CLAUSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH PROHIBITS
UNAUTHORIZED MONITORING BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS OF
CONVERSATIONS TRANSMITTED BY MEANS OF ELECTRONIC
DEVICES.
The appellant moved to suppress a recording of a conversati
between Gayle Lee Boone and the State's informant, Kayle Shaw, Jr.

(R

The motion was denied and the tape was received into evidence (T. 331;
The tape was made by recording a broadcast of the conversation trans·
mitted by an electronic device secreted on the informant's person (T
The broadcast was heard by some police officers who had followed and
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were observing Shaw, although there was some question about what they
heard.
The State agents who were in charge of Shaw's activities

:r did not bother to obtain a search warrant prior to the transmission
1

~and

recording of the conversation.

Such a failure violated the appellant'

constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed in Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the
1

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as it is applied to

1~

the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This is not to say that officials cannot use such devices and make
such recordings, but only that before doing so, the authorities must
:~obtain

a warrant issued on the basis of a determination by a neutral

1:~

and detached magistrate after showing that there is probable cause to

1r\

believe that a crime is being or will be committed.

!

POINT A

!

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH PROTECT THE PRIVACY
OF UTAH CITIZENS AND PROHIBIT THE WARRANTLESS
SURVEILLANCE AND SEIZURE OF THEIR CONVERSATIONS
THROUGH USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES.
The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the
'

1constitution of Utah protect privacy of people, not specified places,

1tu

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);

l 1, 432 p. 2d 64 (1967).

State v. Kent, 20 Ut. 2d

In other words, there is no need for a physical

1;i intrusion or trespass to have a violation of this right to privacy.

In the majority opinion in Katz v. United States, supra, Justice Stewart
J,

described the nature of this right.

- 41 -
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What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection. [citations
omitted] But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in the area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. [citations omitted]
389 U.S. at 351-352.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan gave a more detailed descriptio
of this right of privacy:
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." The question, however,
is what protection it affords to those people.
Generally, as here, the answer to that question
requires reference to a "place". My understanding
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable".
389 U.S. at 362, Harlan, J. Concurring.
In Katz v. United States, supra, the Court held that a
persons's conversations were within this expectation of privacy and
the overhearing of such conversations constituted a seizure within thf'
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The protection of this aspect of

privacy is accomplished by means of the warrant clause of the Fourth I
Amendment (and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah).

Tl~

purpose of the warrant clause is to place limitations on official
activities.

These limitations include:

The requirement that officiali

must present their estimate of probable cause for the detached scrutir,7
of a neutral magistrate.

Secondly, during a search, a warrant compel'

officers to observe precise limits established in advance by specific
court order.

Finally, after the search has been conducted officers

will be required to notify an authorized magistrate of all that has
been seized.
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In Katz v. United States, supra, a transmitter was placed
in a phone booth enabling police to overhear the defendant's conversations

Even though it was operated only when the defendant was using the phone
and in a limited means, the court refused to uphold the search stating:

[T]his Court has never sustained a search upon the
sole ground that officers reasonably expected to
find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily
confined their activities to the least intrusive
means consistent with that end. 389 U.S. at 356-357.
As noted above this Court also recognizes that the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah are
aimed at the protection of a person's privacy.

State v. Kent, supra.

Furthermore, by enacting Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402 (1973), the State
legislature has recognized the need to protect the privacy of people.
This statute provides:

I

'.~

76-9-402. Privacy violation - (1) A person is guilty
of privacy violation if, except as authorized by law,
he:
(a) Trespasses on property with intent to subject
anyone to eavesdropping or other surveillance in a
private place; or
(b) Installs in any private place, without the
consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy
there, any device for observing, photographing,
recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or
events in the place or uses any such unauthorized
installation; or
(c) Installs or uses outside of a private place
any device for hearing, recording, amplifying, or
broadcasting sounds originating in the place which
would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible
outside, without the consent of the person or persons
entitled to privacy there.
(2) Privacy violation is a Class B misdemeanor.
An important aspect of this statute is the exception of
"except as authorized by law".

Obviously, this is intended to allow

such invasions of privacy if done by judicial authorization
search warrant.
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a valid

POINT B

m

A CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM WARRANTLESS
SURVEILLANCE AND SEIZURE OF HIS CONVERSATIONS
THROUGH USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES IS NOT WAIVED
MERELY BECAUSE SUCH CONVERSATION IS WITH A
GOVERNMENT AGENT.

In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) the Suprem11t

Court was faced with a fact situation very similar to the case at hant 0

Four of the justices distinguished Katz v. United States, supra, and t
upheld the search;

Justice Black concurred on the basis of his disse:1a

in Katz v. United States, supra,

(he believed that the Fourth Amendme:IF

applied only to tangible, not comm.unicative evidence).

Justice

Brenn~

refused to apply Katz v. Unites States, supra, retroactively, and
Justice Harlan authored a strong dissent that the two other justices

c

concurred in.

The basic argument of Justice White's plurality opinion i;l 1
the the petitioner had waived the protection of his privacy by talkin;I
to a third person, who incidentally was wired to boradcast the conver·.
sation to government agents.

To be able to reach this conclusion the:,

case of Katz v. United States, supra, had to be distinguished.
White found two distinguishing factors:

(1)

Justi:~

in Katz neither party tt

the conversations knew that the government was eavesdropping;

1

and (1;,

even in Katz there was no justifiable and constituttionally protected
expectation that the person with whom one is conversing will not later
reveal the conversation to the police.

To support this second dis-

I

tinguishing feature Justice White cited Lopez v. United States, 373

d

427 (1963), Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), and
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).

Hoff~

The theme that Justice White

erroneously extracted from these three cases was that the Fourth Ameni·
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1ent does not protect a person from "misplaced confidence" in a friend

,r informer.

He then went on to hold that if the conduct and revelations

Jf an undercover agent do not invade one's "consitutionally justifiable
~xpectations

of privacy," then a simultaneous recording or electronic

:ransmission to others likewise does not invade one's privacy.

Stated

Jtherwise, "a constitutional license to employ secret agents generates

:he correlative right to electronically eavesdrop without prior judicial

mthorization."

Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to

Privacy, 52 Boston University Law Review 831 (1972).
There are two problems with Justice White's opinion:

The

first is that he misstated the legal basis that leads to his conclusion

of waiver;

the second is that he fails to correctly analyze

interests that are at stake.

the

The misstated legal basis will be discussed

first.
The case that Justice White cites to stand for the proposition
that electronic devices such as recorders and transmitters will not
constitute an invasion of privacy is Lopez v. United States, supra.

In

that case the defendant was found guilty of attempting to bribe a
government agent.

The offer of the bribe had been recorded by the agent

who had a hidden recording device on his person at the time of the offer.
Two of the major factors that the court found to be the basis of its
holding were that at the time the recording was being made it was not
being transmitted to third persons and secondly, the defendant had
assumed the risk of government intrusion because he was attempting to
bribe a person who he knew to be a government agent.

Obviously, the

factual basis of the holding in this case is clearly distinguishable

from the facts both in United States v. White, supra, and the facts in
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the case at bar.

In both United States v. White, supra, and in the

case at hand the conversations were broadcast to third persons and
in both there was no expectation of direct governmental involvement.
In both Lewis v. United States, supra, and in Hoffa v.
United States, supra, the court based its decision on a trespass analisl
That type of analysis had been strongly rejected in Katz v. United
States, supra.

In Hoffa the court held that an informer who was an

invited guest could not be found to have committed a trespass (at tha:
1

time Fourth Amendment questions were analyzed in terms of trespass).
It is doubtful, however, under the trespass analysis that the invitato
would have extended to uninvited third party government agents who we:e
listening by means of electronic devices.
In Lewis v. United States, supra, a government agent pur·
chased narcotics at the defendant's residence then arrested him.

The!

court held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect one who volunta:~
converts a constitutionally protected area into a commercial center.
This case did not involve any

ele~tronic

transmitters or recorders.

It did not even involve any connnunications to third parties.

It si111]1:11

is not applicable as a legal basis for the holding in United States v I
White , supra.
The analytical problems with 'United States v. White, supr:
are discussed in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion.

Justice White''

opinion is analytically incorrect with respect to his interpretation:'
both the privacy and waiver issues.

The privacy question will be dis· I

cussed first.
The first problem with White's analysis of the privacy '.sl
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is that the interests simply are not the same when there is a misplaced
confidence in an individual who turns out to be an informant, and when

1

1

a conversation is electronically broadcast to third persons who are
government agents.

Typically, when one person engages another in

conversation there are two considerations:

11

who will hear the conversa-

tion and how will the conversation be reported to others.

Before

entering a conversation of a private nature the speaker will usually
I

analyze these concerns in terms of his subjective belief that the
listener will not broadcast the content of this conversation to others

land his knowledge of the credibility of the listener (in case the listener
~does

make such a broadcast).

If there is a substantial risk that

conversations expected to be private are boradcast to third persons,
an individual's freedom to make his own choice of who he will speak with
I

and what he will say will be substantially impaired.

Likewise, if people are subject to the fear that their
'conversations will be broadcast to government agents other interests
will be affected.

These interests were eloquently described by Justice

i
'I Harlan in his dissenting opinion in United States v. White, supra.

I description is well worth repeating:

The impact of the practice of third-party
bugging, must, I think, be considered such as to
undermine that confidence and sense of security
in dealing with one another that is characteristic
of individual relationships between citizens in a
free society. It goes beyond the impact on privacy
occasioned by the ordinary type of "informer"
investigation upheld in Lewis and Hoffa. The
argument of the plurality opinion, to the effect
that it is irrelevant whether secrets are revealed by
the mere tattletale or the transistor, ignores the
differences occasioned by third-party monitoring
and recording which insures full and accurate disclosure
of all that is said, free of the possibili~y of error
and oversight that inheres in human reporting.
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His

Authority is hardly required to support the
proposition that words would be measured a good deal
more carefully and corranunication inhibited if one
suspected his conversations were being transmitted
and transcribed. Were third-party bugging a prevalent
practice, it might well smother that spontaneity
reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious,
offhand exchange is easily forgotten and one may
count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by
the very fact of a limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener will either overlook or
forget what is said, as well as the listener's
inability to reformulate a conversation without values
are sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official
monitoring of private discourse limited only by the
need to locate a willing assistant [footnote omitted]
401 U.S. at 787-789, Harlan J. dissenting.
Another significant effect of this fear of third person
official monitoring is that people will lose an important medium for
relieving social tension.

Tension is often relieved by such things

a>

making idle threats, boasting about fictitious acts or even falsely
claiming responsibility for the commission of well publicized crimes.

i

In such conversation little harm is done, and it serves as a healthy
outlet for various tensions.

But if the conversation is suppressed

the tensions will remain, and these tensions will be compounded by the, 1
belief that any comment may be overheard by some government agent.

I=

To say there will be chilling effect on the exercise of free speach
would be an understatement.
a cruel reality.

The Orwellian nightmare of 1984 will

bee~'

In any conversation it would become reasonable to

believe that there are government agents listening somewhere.

The

protection that is built into our federal and state constitutions aga:n
such omnipresence is the warTant clause of the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah which prohibits seari
and seizures without a warrant.

The protection simply is that gove~;

agents must show to a neutral and detached magistrate that there is
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~robable

cause to believe that a crime is being or will be connnitted

\efore government agents are allowed to listen to a person's personal
:onversations by means of a transmitter attached to the body of an
informant.
Some might argue that the government may act with self
restraint and respect for privacy.
in Katz v. United States, supra.

This argument was expressly rejected
The Fourth Amendment was not premised

on good faith and self-restraint of the police.

The Fourth Amendment

was premised on the abuses of power in King George's writs of assistance
during Colonial times.

The Fourth Amendment functions as a check on

the abuses of authority and the worst tendancies of government.
With respect to the waiver question, Justice White's analysis
1inges on the underlying proposition that a risk of bugging will have
"o behavioral effect on a person contemplating a crime once he decides
to trust a confederate.

His argument is in terms of the typical criminal.

This breaks down when it is the innocent citizen that is used as the
i

model.

With an innocent citizen the risks of surveillance are not

!assumed by the actor.

The risks come to that actor when the police

decide to "bug" an informer.
~as

This means that an unconventional behavior

well as behavior that is on the borderline of illegality will arouse

the curiosity of the authorities.

Once that curiosity is aroused the

authorities are allowed to attach a transmitter to a confidant of the
1~speaker

in.

and listen to any and all conversations that their suspect engages:

This can be done even if there is little or no reason to believe

1rcthat there is any criminal activity involved.
Such imposition of hidden and unforeseen risks on the cit'.enry were expressly prohibited by Katz v. United States, supra.
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Following the analysis in Katz it is reasonable to assume that a pers 0
speaking to another about possible criminal activities subjectively
does not expect that other person to broadcast the content of the
conversation to third persons.

However, using a reasonable person tesi

it is quite likely that the content of the conversation will be told
to others.

But it is quite unlikely that any reasonable person would

believe that his conversation is being simultaneously broadcast to

some government agents simply because he reveals information to a pen(
in whom he has misplaced his trust.
POINT C
EFFECTIVE POLICE INVESTIGATION IS NOT HAMPERED
BY REQUIRING THAT A WARRANT BE OBTAINED BEFORE
GOVERNMENT AGENTS CAN ENGAGE IN THIRD PERSON
MONITORING; CONSEQUENTLY ANY SUCH MONITORING
WITHOUT A WARRANT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975),
the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected Justice White's analysis and
legal basis in United States v. White, supra, and held that a warrant
must be obtained before government agents could monitor conversations
between an informant and a suspect if any evidence of that conversatior
other than the informant's version, is to be used in court.

The

Michigan court accepted Justice Harlan's view that a person's expectati
of privacy should not be subject to the possibility that communication1
directed to particular persons are simultaneously being intercepted bv
third party government agents.

It is also important to note that

the Michigan Legislature has enacted provisions in its penal
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code

that are similar to those of Utah Code Annotated §76-9-402
14
(1973).
The same primary interests receive protection in both Utah

and Michigan.
Most of this argument has dealt with the probability of
abuse if this type of surveillance is not subjected to the warrant

I

requirement.

Undoubtedly, the government will argue that this type

of surveillance is necessary for police investigation.

There is no

question that this technique is necessary for investigation.

1

However,

the government officials are not the people who should make the determina-

13. §28.807(2) Tresspassing for eavesdropping or surveillance rm;vses] Sec. 539b.
Aperson who trespasses on property owned or Ui1der the control o any other person,
to subject that person to eavesdropping or surveillance is guilty of a misdaneanor.
§28.807(3) U~ device to eave~upon conversation] Se. 539c. Any person
who is present or
is not present
a private conversation and who willfully
uses any device to eavesdrop upon the conversation without the consent of all parties
thereto, or who knowingly aids, employs or procures another person to do the same in
violation of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisomnent in
a state prison for not IIDre than 2 years or by a fine of not IIDre than $2, 000 or both.
§28.807(4) Installing surveillance or eavesdropping devices] Sec. 539d. Any
person who installs in any private place, withOUt the consent of the person or
persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing, photographing, or
eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in such place, or uses any such unauthorized
installation, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisomnent in a state prison
. for not IIDre than 2 years or by a fine of not IIDre than $2, 000 or both.

14.
1

76-9-402. Privacy violation. - (1) A person is guilty of privacy violation
if, except as authorized by law, he:
(a) Trespasses on property with intent to subject anyone to eavesdropping or

other surveillance in a private place; or
(b) Installs in any private place, without the consent of the person or
persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing, photographing, recording,
amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events in the place of uses any such unauthorized
installation; or
(c) Installs or uses outside of a private place any device for hearing, recording,
amplifying, or broadcasting sounds originating in the place which would not ordinarily i
'be audible or canprehensible outside, without the consent of the person or persons
'
entitled to privacy there.
(2) Privacy violation is a Class B mis~r.
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tion of which people will be subjected to surveillance.

The Fourth

St

Amendment requires that such a determination will ultimately be made

a

by a neutral and detached magistrate.

co

The magistrate can make an

objective detErmination of whether the government agents have probable
cause to believe that a crime is being committed.

This is the means

by which our founding fathers saw fit to curb the abuses of the English
monarchy -

such abuses, incidentally, were a major cause of the

Revolutionary War.

In the case at hand, the fact that a warrant was

not obtained must be taken as an admission of lack of probable cause
at the time the drug buy was supposed to have taken place.

The govern· In

ment agents had taken elaborate precautions to set up a drug buy.

The re<

buy was set up in advance through the informant (T. 171).

The informan

was subjected to a skin search and search of his vehicle.

The electron

transmitter was taped to his body (T. 173).

The agents made photocopie

of all the bills that were to be used in the purchase (T. 175).

The

informant was searched a second time, and the money was counted a
second time when the informant left the gym to get something to eat
(T. 180).

Finally, there were about a dozen other officers in six

monitoring the conversation (T. 174).

car~

With all of these elaborate

precautions the government agents did not see fit to obtain a warrant·
a very simple procedure if there is in fact probable cause to believe
a crime is being or will be committed.

Stated otherwise, the governmet

agents took elaborate precautions to protect the interests of the
State, but did not even take the slightest precaution to protect the
constitutional rights of Boone or the appellant.
The reasonableness of not obtaining a warrant prior to
conducting a search is determined by balancing the interests of the
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State against those interests that an individual has in requiring that
a warrant be obtained.

State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah, 1977). The

compeating interests were described in State v. Beavers, supra;
We are acutely sensitive to the fundamental
interests involved when prevailing law enforcement
techniques are balanced against protections guaranteed
citizens under the state and Federal constitutions.
With the advent of increasingly sophisticated
electronic surveillance equipment, the evolving body
of law which seeks to reconcile the need for effective
police investigative practices in combatting criminal
activity with the ominous spectre of the Orwellian
Big Brother is fraught with complexities. 227 N.W.
2d at 514.
In resolving these two conflicting interests the Michigan court then

reasoned;
Participant monitoring is practiced extensively
throughout the country and represents a vitally important investigative tool of law enforcement. Equally
significant is the security and confidence enjoyed
by our citizenry in knowing that the risk of intrusion
by this type of electronic surveillance is subject to
the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. By interposing the search warrant
requirement prior to engaging in participant monitoring,
the risk that one's conversation is being intercepted
is rightfully limited to circumstances involving a
party whose conduct has provided probable cause to an
independent magistrate to suspect such party's involvement in illegal activity. The warrant requirement is
not a burdensome formality designed to protect those
who would engage in illegal activity, but, rather a
procedure which guarantees a measure of privacy and
personal security to all citizens. The interests of
both society and the individual should not rest upon
the exercise of the unerring judgment and selfrestraint of law enforcement officials. Our laws must
ensure that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen may
continue to engage in private discourse, free to sp7ak.
with the uninhibited spontanceity that is characteristic
of our democratic society. 227 N.W. 2d at 515.
Absent a specific finding of probable cause either in the
:ssuance of a warrant or in a pre-trial suppression motion the seizure
f

this evidence must be deemed to be unreasonable.

Furthermore,
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this court is prohibited from reviewing the record at the trial to
find probable cause.

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).

Consequent~.

the tape recording used in the trial constituted a violation of the
appellant's Fourth Amendment rights.
suppressed.

The tape must have been

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

The appellant in the case at hand has standing to suppress.
this evidence because it was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.

The reasons why the appellant has standing are that:

The fruits of this unlawful search against the appellant.

the tape recording -

were used

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).

The appellant's co-defendant, Boone, had a reasonable expectation of
freedom from governmental intrusion, Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364

(1968).

Finally, this evidence was obtained in the course of a govern-

ment investigation ultimately to be used against the appellant at trial
15
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
Since this evidence
was all that tied the appellant to the drug sale its use is not harmles:
beyond a reasonable doubt so the use of the evidence was prejudicial,
Chapman v. California, supra.

The case must be remanded to the District

Court for a new trial.

15.

The majority of the court in Alderman v. United States, supra, held that
the only people who have standing to suppress are those Whose rights are aggrieved.
However-, this is clearly erroneous as the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section

14 of the Constitution of Utah are general prohibitions on unreasonable searches
and seizures. Furtherm:rre, the general policy behind the exclusionary rule is
to deter illegal police practices, Mapp v. Ohio, supra. Such a policy is not
furthered by the use of the evidence against any co-defendant in a criminal case·
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CONCLUSION
The use of the tape recording of the transaction between
the appellant and Kayle Shaw violated the appellant's rights guaranteed

by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah which resulted in a denial of
appellant's right to a fair trial.
in Point VII.

All the other errors were reviewed

When the cummulative effect of these errors is considered

the reversal of the trial court's judgment is mandated.
DATED this

day of March, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant
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